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Abstract: We present evidence that ethnic fragmentation explains variations in per capita income, 
institutions, and schooling better than income inequality when both are treated as endogenous. To do so, 
we identify instruments for ethnic fractionalization and income inequality based on historical 
experience. Using instrumental variables estimation, we find that ethnic fractionalization explains the 
level of income both when income inequality is included as a control in the estimation and when it is 
not.  However, we find no evidence that income inequality affects the level of income when ethnic 
fractionalization is properly treated as an endogenous variable.  We have similar findings when other 
development outcomes such as schooling or proxies for institutional quality are used as dependent 
variables.  These results are robust to various controls and changes in the sample size and suggest that 
some of the previous findings regarding the effect of income inequality on development should be 
attributed to ethnic fractionalization. 
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1 Introduction 
 A large literature finds a role for income inequality in affecting economic development both in 
the presence of credit market imperfections and without.  The channels through which income inequality 
have been posited to work are numerous.  For example, in a seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) show 
that inequality can affect human capital accumulation. Moreover, Persson and Tabellini (1994) show 
how inequality can affect physical capital accumulation via a demand for redistributive policies, Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) argue that inequality affects physical capital investment through its effect on political 
instability, and Banerjee and Newman (1993) demonstrate a role for income inequality in affecting 
occupational choice and the extent of entrepreneurship.  More recently, others have linked inequality to 
the development of low quality institutions as the political elite block institutional reform that would 
benefit the country as a whole but challenge their own dominance (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; 2000).1
At the same time, others have focused on the negative impact of a related but different aspect of 
society—ethnic fractionalization.  Easterly and Levine (1997) show the negative consequences of ethnic 
diversity in African development and argue that too much fractionalization interferes with the provision 
of growth promoting public goods.  Others have confirmed the consequences of ethnic fractionalization 
(Alesina et al. 2003) but Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) argue that ethnic diversity only has negative 
consequences in democracies where the lack of ability to coordinate across different ethnic groups may 
have more severe consequences.  Importantly for our work, Alesina et al. (2003) and Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005) also argue that ethnic diversity is endogenous and careful examinations of the role of 
ethnic diversity in affecting economic outcomes must take that into account.  In addition, Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2000) argue that ethnic diversity may have also played a role in the development of 
institutions by allowing the elites to readily identify a group that could be excluded from privileges such 
as landholding or suffrage.  Thus, ethnic fractionalization may have negative impacts on development 
 
                                                          
1 See Galor (2009ab) for brief and comprehensive treatments of the literature on inequality and growth.  
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independent of the level of economic inequality. Indeed, their work highlights two potential roles of 
ethnicity in political development:  it can be a tool for identification or a potential ideological fault line.  
Thus, a priori, it is unclear whether ethnic differences or income inequality in general are both playing 
independent roles in long run post-colonial development. 
  In spite of a strong theoretical foundation for the effects of inequality on development, robust 
empirical evidence has been difficult to find.  Forbes (2000) finds that inequality has a positive effect on 
growth while Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find an inverted U relationship between growth rates and 
changes in the income distribution.  Furthermore, they argue that it is difficult to interpret any of these 
correlations causally because of difficult identification problems.  In an effort to address the 
identification issue, Easterly (2001a, 2007) uses characteristics of the land that might support plantation-
based economies as instruments for inequality.  He concludes that inequality is associated with lower 
levels of income, schooling and quality of institutions.  Importantly, Easterly (2007) uses a variety of 
control variables, including ethnic fractionalization (treated as an exogenous variable), to demonstrate 
that income inequality is a robust determinant of the level of income per capita. 
In contrast to the empirical literature relating income inequality to development, there is less 
debate about the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization, at least in certain circumstances.  
However, few researchers treat ethnic fractionalization as an endogenous variable even though there are 
clear theoretical reasons to believe that it is. In a related paper, Michalopoulos (2008) identifies 
geographic causes of fractionalization but does not relate fractionalization to income per capita. While 
treating ethnic fractionalization as exogenous may be an appropriate specification in classic growth 
regressions spanning 30 or so years, it is less acceptable over the longer time spans implicit in income 
level regressions (Alesina et al., 2003). Specifically, most migration occurs into those countries with 
higher levels of economic and institutional development, implying that OLS coefficients will 
underestimate the negative impacts of ethnic diversity (Mayda, 2005; Freeman, 2006). Moreover, ethnic 
diversity may hinder the development of institutions and provisions of public goods while countries are 
in the early stages of development, but have a smaller (or non-existent) negative impact once the 
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institutions of democracy and rule of law have been implemented (e.g. Easterly, 2001b). Thus, to best 
determine the role of ethnic fractionalization in development, we need to find instruments for both 
fractionalization and inequality. 
This paper exploits differences in land endowments to identify appropriate instruments for 
ethnic fractionalization. Specifically, we use the likelihood that a country would develop plantations 
based on the suitability for cultivating sugar versus wheat. As pointed out by Engerman and Sokoloff, 
certain crops were associated with the use of slaves because of economies of scale that were realized in 
producing them on large slave plantations.  Thus the qualities of the land in colonial times have 
implications for the ethnic makeup of the population today.   Along the same line, we add tropical 
location and a commodity exporting dummy in later regressions. Because all of these variables have 
been used as instruments for inequality for similar reasons (e.g.,  Easterly; 2001b; 2007) the dimension 
of inequality captured by these instruments is correlated with the dimension of fractionalization captured 
by the same instruments  Thus, an important question is:  Is it income inequality in general that affects 
development or is it ethnic fractionalization? 
In answering this question, we find that ethnic fragmentation is an important determinant of per 
capita income, school enrollment and institutional quality. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, when 
income inequality and ethnic fractionalization are simultaneously added as endogenous variables in such 
regressions, ethnic diversity has a negative and significant effect while income inequality enters 
insignificantly and often with a positive coefficient. These results are robust to numerous controls and 
restricting the sample to only former colonies. The results also clearly indicate that fractionalization 
must be treated as an endogenous variable.  
These results are important because, although income inequality and ethnic fractionalization 
may be correlated empirically, the channels through which ethnic fractionalization affect economic 
development may be different than those through which income inequality affects economic growth.  
There are policy implications to this finding as well:  the best policy to remedy the deleterious effects of 
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ethnic fractionalization may be very different from one aimed at alleviating the effects of income 
inequality. 
To the extent that ethnic fractionalization is a cause of income inequality or perhaps tells us 
something about the nature of the inequality, our results suggest that there are certain types of inequality 
that are worse for economic development than others.  In other words, our results are consistent with the 
idea that inequality that is perpetuated by ethnic divisions may be particularly bad for economic growth. 
 In that sense, to the extent that ethnic fractionalization affects growth via political or institutional 
channels rather than via factor accumulation, our findings complement those who argue that political 
inequality may lead to instability or lack of cohesion which lowers growth (e.g., Perotti, 1996; Rodrik, 
1999; Alesina et al, 2006, Easterly and Woolcock, 2006). Also, our findings are consistent with the 
arguments in the strand of the inequality and growth literature that links inequality to the development 
of low quality institutions if exploiting ethnic divisions is a way for the elite to maintain their economic 
and political power when faced with growing domestic agitation for equal rights or when balancing 
inconsistencies inherent in arguing for freedom from colonizing powers while promoting the 
continuance of slavery (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Benn, 2004).  
 Our results are developed in the next 3 sections.  Section 2 provides more background on the 
ways in which previous literature suggests that ethnic fractionalization affects development outcomes, 
Section 3 presents our empirical results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Related Literature 
Engerman and Sokoloff  (1997; 2000) argue that colonies suitable for the production of 
profitable commodities with economies of scale, like sugar or mining, developed more unequal 
plantation-type societies. According to the theory, this system allowed the entrenched economic elite to 
prevent institutional development, voting rights and public education.  The model is not formal, leaving 
room for the competing effects of ethnicity and income inequality; although the focus is on the latter. 
The Engerman and Sokoloff  theory serves as the motivation for the empirical work by Easterly (2001a, 
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2007), who uses natural endowments as instruments in regressions demonstrating the harmful effects of 
inequality on per capita income, institutional quality and public school provision. The Easterly results 
also demonstrate that fractionalization has a negative impact on these various development outcomes, 
though it is treated as exogenous.  
 The literature on ethnic fractionalization and development outcomes is lengthy. Empirical 
research shows that ethnic diversity leads to lower growth, per capita income and public good provision 
as well as poorer quality government institutions and policies (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; La Porta 
et al, 1999; Alesina et al., 2003).  The standard story is that different ethnic groups cannot agree on a set 
of institutions and public goods because they have different preferences, leading to an under provision 
of necessary government actions. This may entail differences in the types of goods (e.g. roads versus 
schools) or the orientation of certain goods (e.g. where to put the new road) (e.g. Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Another argument is that ethnically divided groups will 
resist necessary reforms in an attempt to ensure that other groups bear the majority of the costs (e.g. 
Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Rodrik, 1999). Still another option is that ethnic heterogeneity permits 
greater social sanctioning, leading to more effective outcomes in situations resembling prisoners’ 
dilemma (e.g. Miguel and Gugerty, 2005).  
Most of these potential mechanisms rely on the rational economic calculation in decision 
making processes. A very different perspective is that people have preferences over ethnic groups. In 
this case, people will not want to support any public good or institution that would benefit another ethnic 
group, even though they would support the exact same measure if it supported a member of their own 
group. For example, Poterba (1997) shows that older whites in US cities are less likely to provide public 
education when the beneficiaries are minority children. Similarly, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) 
find that differences in ethnic heterogeneity help explain the differing levels of redistribution in Europe 
and America.  
The history of suffrage is replete with examples of voting qualifications based on race. Ethnic 
division may affect political transitions in multiple ways. First, it may play a role within strategic 
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decision making of the elites. For example, some studies have modeled the transition from dictatorship 
to democracy as a way for elites to commit to future redistribution and avoid revolution, which would 
place even greater danger on their privileged economic position (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 
2001b). Within this context, elites could better their position by extending voting rights only to those 
members of their same ethnic group, lowering the total future redistribution needed to prevent 
revolution. At the same time, the lower class of the dominant ethnic group would benefit from the 
redistribution in the same way as before, but also gain an advantage over competitors in securing the 
benefits of increased political power. For example, the competition for political patronage or future 
high-skill jobs for the next generation would be greatly reduced. In this case, ethnic differences would 
merely serve as a convenient way to identify and divide groups of people.   
 
3 Empirical Results 
 Our goal is to show that the dimension of inequality that is associated with ethnic 
fractionalization better explains poor growth performance than income inequality in general.  To provide 
convincing empirical results, we will base our specifications on earlier empirical work demonstrating 
the link between inequality and growth (Easterly, 2001a, 2007).  As mentioned in the introduction, our 
contention is that the forces that led to inequality also led to ethnic fractionalization. In particular, earlier 
literature attempts to identify geographic instruments that lead to inequality by providing incentives to 
develop plantations, which bred both inequality and ethnic divisions. Our departure from previous 
literature which leads us to different conclusions is that we will treat both fractionalization and 
inequality as endogenous variables.  
 
3.1 First Stage Results 
First, we show that, in addition to predicting income inequality, land quality also predicts ethnic 
fractionalization.  For our main instrument, we will use the likelihood that a country would export sugar 
or wheat. Specifically, the variable, LWHEATSUGAR, is defined as log (1+area of land suitable for 
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growing wheat/1+area of land suitable for growing sugar). This data originally comes from the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2005). Easterly (2007) demonstrates that 
LWHEATSUGAR is significantly correlated with two measures of inequality: the percent of income 
controlled by the top 20% (INCSHARE) and the Gini coefficient (GINI), which are taken from the 
WIDER (2000) database. Both are averaged over the period of 1960-1998 in order reduce measurement 
error and are adjusted to account for biases introduced by different survey measurement techniques.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 replicate the Easterly (2007) results re income inequality and 
Column 3 of Table 1 shows that we obtain similar results when we use LWHEATSUGAR to predict 
ethnic fractionalization. The measure of fractionalization, originally from Alesina et al (2003), is the 
likelihood that two randomly selected individuals will be from different ethno-linguistic groups. The 
results in Table 1 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in LWHEATSUGAR  decreases 
fractionalization, income share and the Gini coefficient by .36, .44, and .41 standard deviations 
respectively.  The R-squared values for each simple regression in Table 1 are similar and, given the 
theoretical reasons to link land quality to both income inequality and ethnic fractionalization, this 
suggests that land quality may be an equally good instrument for both inequality and fractionalization.  
In the next section, we confirm this supposition.  
3.2 Testing the Effects of Inequality and Fractionalization Separately 
First, we present the estimation results of the effects of fractionalization and inequality when 
land quality is used as an instrument for each in separate regressions in Panel A of Table 2.  Columns 1 
and 4 present results when the gini coefficient and the income share of the top 20 percent are used as 
measures of inequality and the dependent variable is the log of per capita income in 2002.2
                                                          
2 We use the log of income per capita in 2002 so that our results can be directly compared to those in Easterly 
(2007). 
  These 
results replicate those in Easterly (2007).  However, in column 7 we report results when we substitute 
fractionalization for inequality and find that fractionalization also has the expected negative effect on 
income per capita.   
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As mentioned earlier, two ways in which inequality and fractionalization have been 
hypothesized to affect growth is via the accumulation of human capital or via the development of 
institutions.  To see if there is evidence for these channels in our data we also report similar regressions 
in Table 2, using a measure of human capital accumulation and institution quality.  So our results can be 
comparable to the previous literature we again use the same variables employed by Easterly (2007), 
kkz02, an aggregate measure of institutional quality from Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) and 
secondary school enrollment rates averaged from 1998-2002 (sec9802).   These results appear in the 
remaining columns of Table 2 and show that in all cases, both inequality and fractionalization are 
significantly and negatively associated with institutional quality and schooling enrollments. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we repeat the estimations results after adding the share of arable land in 
the tropics (tropical) as a second instrument in order to perform over identification tests. Again, the 
explanatory variable is significant at the 1% level in all nine regressions and, more importantly, 
fractionalization passes the over identification test in all three regressions; the tests fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that LWHEATSUGAR and tropical are uncorrelated with the error term and are correctly 
excluded from each of the estimated equationsOf course, the same can be said for 5 of the 6 regressions 
with inequality as the explanatory variables. We also present the p-values and F-statitistics from the first 
stage regressions in order to ensure that the instruments are actually significant predictors of the 
fractionalization and inequality. Again, the results suggest that the natural endowments predict 
significant variation in both instrumented variables.  
So, we have found that ethnic fractionalization and income inequality present equally plausible 
explanations for why the historical experience of countries as “plantation economies” is associated with 
slower growth than that experienced by their counterparts. One way to get a relative sense of which may 
be more important is to compare the size of the coefficients. Table 3 shows the relative effects of a one 
standard deviation change in ethnic diversity and income inequality for each dependent variable based 
on the results in panel A of table 2. Although ethnic fractionalization has the highest impact for all three 
dependent variables, the results are similar enough that it would be premature to draw any conclusions.  
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Thus, to sort out the relative importance of ethnic fractionalization vs. income inequality, we 
move on to an alternative approach, adding control variables from the previous literature: a commodity 
exporting indicator variable, the share of arable land in the tropics, legal heritage, and continent 
dummies. Easterly (2007) demonstrates that the results for income inequality are robust to all of the 
following, and we do not replicate his results in order to conserve space. Our results for similar 
estimations using ethnic fractionalization appear in Table 4.  In 11 of the 12 specifications, ethnic 
fractionalization is significant at the 5% level or better. When using income per capita as the dependent 
variable and adding tropical as a control, FRAC is significant at the 10% level (p-value of .06). These 
results continue to suggest that income inequality and ethnic fractionalization could each have important 
effects on long-run development.3
 
 
3.3 The “Horserace” 
 Since both fractionalization and income inequality appear to be important determinants of long-
run development when investigated separately, we now enter them simultaneously into instrumental 
variables regressions. As we noted earlier, the two variables are correlated and the reason for similar 
results when using each one separately may be that one is proxying for the other.  This “horserace” 
technique allows us to determine which variable exerts a greater effect and is similar to the approach 
taken by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Rodrik Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and Easterly and 
Levine (2003) who attempt to determine the relative importance of competing factors that could 
influence growth.   
To run this test, we need multiple instruments. Unfortunately, multicolinearity prevents us from 
identifying the results when we use only LWHEATSUGAR and tropical. Thus, we looked to earlier 
empirical work related motivated by the potential link between institutions and inequality to find a third 
                                                          
3 We also explored using the number of times a country had an internal conflict over the period 1946-2008.  We 
found that adding this control variable did not materially affect our conclusions about the impact of ethnic 
fractionalization, but the control variable itself did not consistently enter the estimations in a statistically 
significant way.  Data was from the Centre for the Study of Civil War web site:  
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/ 
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instrument. Specifically, we use a commodity exporting dummy (commod), which Easterly (2001a) uses 
as an instrument for inequality in similar regressions. The theory is identical to that motivating the use 
of LWHEATSUGAR, specifically that commodity exporting can lead to plantation economies. Thus, the 
three instruments related to the previous work are LWHEATSUGAR, commod and tropical; however, to 
separate the effects of ethnic fractionalization and inequality, we need to generate sufficient variation 
between the two. To help with this process, we make a slight departure from Easterly 2007 and 
substitute the absolute value of latitude for tropical. We combine these three instruments for inequality 
(latitude, commod and LWHEATSUGAR) to test the relative effects of inequality and ethnic 
fractionalization. Thus, our specification is as follows: 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽11𝐿𝑊𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈𝐺𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽13𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖          (1) 
 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽21𝐿𝑊𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈𝐺𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽23𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖        (2) 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛾1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖 + 𝜹𝒁𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖                    (3) 
where INEQ is either the income share of the richest quintile or the gini coefficient, 𝑦 is the log of the 
level of income per capita, school enrollment rate or the KKZ02 measure of institutional quality, and 𝒁 is 
a vector of control variables.  All results are confirmed (but not shown) when using tropical instead of 
latitude to fully embed our results in the earlier work.  
Table 5 presents the base results. In Panel A, the Gini coefficient is the measure of inequality. 
Column 1 demonstrates that ethnic fractionalization has a negative impact on the log of income per 
capita and that this relationship is significant at the 1% level. However, the Gini coefficient has an 
insignificant and positive coefficient. The next two columns add legal heritage and continent dummies 
as controls, which do not alter the main results. The overidentification tests indicate that the instruments 
can be safely excluded from the second stage regressions. Similarly, the first stage results indicate a 
strong correlation between the natural endowments and both fractionalization and inequality. The results 
are similar when using the institutional quality index as the dependent variable, except that 
fractionalization is just insignificant at the 5% level when no controls are added, and inequality always 
has a negative sign. The final three columns use schooling as the dependent variable. Fractionalization is 
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significant at the 1% level in all specifications while the Gini coefficient is insignificant and positive. 
The results are very similar in panel B, which uses INCSHARE instead of GINI. Thus, the results 
indicate that ethnic diversity exerts a more robust effect on long-run development than does income 
inequality. 
Why are our results different from those found by previous authors?  The main difference in our 
approach is that we treated ethnic fractionalization as an endogenous variable in the estimation of 
income per capita.  As we argued earlier, changes in income per capita can induce migration over the 
long-run which would affect the ethnic diversity of a country’s population.  If high income induced 
migration which produced greater diversity, treating ethnic diversity as exogenous causes the coefficient 
on ethnic diversity to be biased upwards, counteracting the hypothesized negative effect of ethnic 
fractionalization on income. 
 Importantly, we are able to test the exogeneity assumption (for both income inequality and 
fractionalization) statistically.  The test statistic for, say, fractionalization is the difference in the 
Sargent-Hansen statistic when fractionalization is treated as endogenous and when it is treated as 
exogenous. The null hypothesis is that the variable in question can actually be treated as exogenous. The 
results clearly support the contention that fractionalization must be treated as an endogenous variable. 
We can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level in 5 of the 6 regressions where lgdppc is the dependent 
variable and at the 1% level whenever sec9802 is the dependent variable. When KKZ02 is the dependent 
variable, the null hypothesis can only be rejected in 4 of the 6 regressions. Interestingly, the results 
consistently state that we can treat income inequality as an exogenous variable, a specification which we 
will discuss later. It is important to remember, however, that the use of IV to identify the effects of 
income inequality is not primarily motivated by concerns over reverse causality. Rather, “structural” and 
“market-based” inequality may have very different effects. Thus, we continue to treat inequality as 
endogenous is most of the remaining specifications.  
 To build on these results, Table 6 splits up the individual governance indicators that comprise 
kkz02: measures of “voice and accountability” (voice2002), “political stability” (polstab2002), 
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“government efficiency” (govteff2002), “regulation quality” (regqual2002), “rule of law” (rulelaw2002) 
and “corruption” (corrupt2002).  Fractionalization is negative and significant in 15 of the 18 
specifications, suggesting that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on all of the different aspects of 
“good governance” comprising the aggregate index. The correlation is especially strong when using 
rulelaw2002, regqual2002 or govteff2002. Also, FRAC is found to be endogenous is half of the 
specifications, including specifications for all of the dependent variables except for polstab2002. This 
implies that migration occurs towards countries with higher governance scores for all other measures, 
though it is difficult to tease out the specific reasons for migration due to correlation between different 
measures as well as correlation between good governance, income levels and schooling. Inequality, on 
the other hand, is never significant, though it always has the expected negative sign. Once again, it is 
never found to be endogenous.  
 The use of our instruments is motivated by the experiences of former European colonies. While 
extending the sample to include all countries is beneficial because it enlarges the sample size and makes 
our work comparable to others, it is also important to confirm that the results hold when we restrict the 
sample to only former colonies. We do so in table 7. The results are very similar, except that 
fractionalization is significant at lower levels of confidence, likely due to the substantial decrease in 
sample size. Specifically, FRAC is significant in all but four of the eighteen specifications.  In all 
regressions where schooling is the dependent variable, ethnic diversity is significant at the 5% level. 
Inequality is consistently insignificant with inconsistent signs. Once again, the overidentification tests 
do not indicate any problems with the validity of the instruments, but the first stage results are not 
always significant. This is likely a result of the substantial decrease in sample size. Also, the 
endogeneity tests confirm the argument that fractionalization must be treated as an endogenous variable.  
 Finally, we re-test our main results when treating inequality as exogenous. The implications are 
similar to all of the evidence presented earlier. FRAC is significant at the 1% level in all regression 
while inequality is highly insignificant with inconsistent signs. Again, this is not our preferred 
specification because it blurs the effects of “structural” and “market-based” inequality. The results do 
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confirm, however, the major finding of this paper, namely that fractionalization better explains long run 
development than income inequality.  
 
4 Discussion  
 While this paper has focused on comparing the effects of inequality and ethnic fractionalization, 
we view our results as complementary to the growing literature on the “structural” effects of income 
inequality (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Easterly, 2007). 
This literature focuses on how inequality prevents the emergence of political systems that provide basic 
market-supporting institutions and public goods because the elites resist such institutions.  Thus, the 
economic elites use their power to protect their own position at the expense of total economic growth.   
A long literature on ethnic fractionalization suggests similar outcomes emerging through similar 
but distinct mechanisms. Specifically, different factions struggle to ensure that the allocation of 
government resources disproportionately benefit their own side. This struggle prevents countries from 
solving collective action problems and undercuts the validity and effectiveness of existing government 
institutions by spurring (in reality or perception) ethnic groups to use them in a partial manner. Thus, 
inequality prevents the emergence of high quality institutions because the people who control the 
development of their own political and economic institutions do not want to allow others to close the 
gap by improving their own position. Ethnic diversity, on the other, leads to a struggle between 
competing factions that can lead to worse economic outcomes even if one group does not have complete 
control over the governmental resources. As in the inequality literature, the importance of ethnic 
diversity in long-run development works through the “structural” factors that prevent countries from 
developing appropriate market-supporting institutions and public goods due to the existence of 
incentives for certain actors that are misaligned with the optimal social outcomes.  
We provide evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a greater effect on economic development 
than income inequality. This does not imply that inequality has no effect; rather, the existing data (using 
the previously identified instruments) suggest that fractionalization has a stronger effect and that high 
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income inequality is not sufficient condition to lead to worse economic outcomes. Technically, our 
major addition to the literature is to treat ethnic fractionalization as endogenous.  
In addition to showing that ethnic fractionalization affects the level of income, we show that it 
also affects investment in schooling.  In our estimations, ethnic fractionalization has a strong negative 
effect on secondary school enrollment rates, while inequality has an insignificant and often positive 
impact. This result challenges the notion that elites will simply restrict access to public goods in order to 
maintain their privileged position. There are several reasons why elites may not block access to public 
education based simply on income differences.  First, income differences could be insufficient 
motivation for a person to be willing to view the success of their group or (or himself) separately from 
the success of a country as a whole. Second, elites may simply lack the power to restrict public good 
provisions based on income. Finally, recent work in developing a unified growth theory argues that 
elites (or at least some portion of elites) benefitted from having a more well-educated public (Galor and 
Moav, 2004; Galor, 2005; Golar, Moav and Vollrath, 2009). Instead, the results confirm the notion that 
ethnic differences prevent societies from overcoming the collective action problems inherent in 
providing public goods.  
Another set of results suggests that ethnic fractionalization also affects income via the 
development of institutional quality.  As above, we don’t find that income inequality in general 
consistently affects income in a statistically significant way.  The results for ethnic fractionalization, 
however, show many signs of persistent conflict in the development of effective institutions.  These 
struggles manifest themselves in high levels of corruption and regulatory interference in the market and 
inefficient provision of services by the government bureaucracy and justice systems, all of which could 
result from ethnic groups attempting to use the government to extract rents from opposing segments of 
society. Similarly, lower scores on the “voice and accountability” measure could be the result of 
entrenched ethnic interests preventing real electoral competition. Finally, the relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and “political stability and violence” is likely a response of the inability of diverse 
societies to mediate problems through established political channels.  
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5 Conclusion 
 We provide evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is better able to explain differences in income 
levels, school enrollment rates, and institutional quality than income inequality. Our results suggest that 
the nature of divisions in society may be particularly important in determining the effects of inequality 
on development. 
 Differences in economic performance between former European colonies have received much 
attention in the literature. We have provided evidence that ethnic fractionalization, rather than income 
inequality in general, is the major driving force behind differing paths to political and economic 
development. The results also suggest that ethnic differences have an important role to play in the 
literature on political transition (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001b 2006ab). These results add 
to a long literature identifying the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 
1997; Alesina et al, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Indeed, our results have implications for all 
regressions using the level of income as the dependent variable by implying that ethnic fractionalization 
must be treated as endogenous.  
.  
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Table 1: Land Endowments, Inequality and Fractionalization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 GINI INCSHARE FRAC 
 OLS OLS OLS 
LWHEATSUGAR -18.328*** -19.133*** -0.441*** 
 (3.279) (2.992) (0.096) 
Constant 44.555*** 49.275*** 0.478*** 
 (0.923) (0.798) (0.024) 
Observations 118 114 118 
R-squared 0.169 0.216 0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GINI is the gini coefficient. INCSHARE is 
the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. LWHEATSUGAR is log (1+area 
suitable for growing wheat/1+area suitable for growing sugar). 
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Table 2: Base Results with Inequality and Fractionalization Separate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 lgdppc kkz2002 sec9802 lgdppc kkz2002 sec9802 lgdppc kkz2002 sec9802 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
 
Panel A: Results with LWHEATSUGAR as Instrument 
GINI -0.121*** -0.091*** -4.891***       
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.960)       
INCSHARE    -0.127*** -0.098*** -4.795***    
    (0.029) (0.020) (0.876)    
FRAC       -4.791*** -3.798*** -184.518*** 
       (1.050) (0.819) (33.969) 
Cons 13.030*** 3.910*** 278.252*** 13.888*** 4.658*** 296.781*** 9.935*** 1.657*** 149.694*** 
 (1.132) (0.847) (39.440) (1.388) (0.951) (40.601) (0.483) (0.359) (14.523) 
Obs 97 118 113 96 114 110 97 118 113 
FS F-Stat 27.419 31.233 28.800 31.244 40.896 37.744 20.486 21.054 25.480 
FS P-Value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
          
Panel B: Results with LWHEATSUGAR and Tropical as Instruments 
GINI -0.123*** -0.096*** -4.933***       
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.981)       
INCSHARE    -0.128*** -0.098*** -4.695***    
    (0.030) (0.020) (0.848)    
FRAC       -4.156*** -3.446*** -179.457*** 
       (0.856) (0.703) (33.222) 
Cons 13.119*** 4.117*** 279.786*** 13.944*** 4.687*** 291.731*** 9.639*** 1.501*** 146.847*** 
 (1.187) (0.880) (40.352) (1.411) (0.961) (39.285) (0.393) (0.315) (13.926) 
Obs 95 116 111 95 113 109 95 116 111 
OIR 0.6308 0.5885 0.2188 0.3071 0.3022 0.0835* 0.3215 0.3320 0.8884 
FS F-Stat 12.98 15.01 13.92 15.44 20.45 19.08 13.51 13.02 14.39 
FS P-Value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  OIR is the p-value for the Hansen’s J test 
of the exclusion restriction. FS F-Stat and FS P-Value are the F-Statistic and P-value from the first stage 
regression. Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can actually be treated as exogenous. GINI is the gini 
coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. 
LGDPPC is the log of real GDP per capita in 2002.  KKZ2002 is a composite measure of institutional quality.  
SEC9802 is the average secondary school enrollment rate over the period 1998-2002.   
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Table 3: Comparing Effects using Standard Deviations 
 lgdppc kkz02 sec9802 
GINI -1.09 -1.04 -1.27 
INCSHARE -1.1 -1.09 -1.2 
FRAC -1.2 -1.21 -1.33 
This table shows the effects of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variables  on the dependent 
variable (also in standard deviations) from table 2. GINI is the gini coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of 
the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. LGDPPC is the log of real GDP per capita in 2002.  
KKZ2002 is a composite measure of institutional quality.  SEC9802 is the average secondary school enrollment 
rate over the period 1998-2002.
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Table 4: Effects of Fractionalization with Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 lgdppc lgdppc lgdppc lgdppc kkz2002 kkz2002 kkz2002 kkz2002 sec9802 sec9802 sec9802 sec9802 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
FRAC -6.561* -4.479*** -5.852*** -4.406** -5.369** -4.274*** -4.888*** -4.047*** -189.036*** -182.280*** -211.173*** -132.371*** 
 (3.424) (1.198) (1.734) (1.777) (2.711) (1.099) (1.416) (1.376) (70.489) (44.125) (63.494) (36.381) 
Tropical 0.744    0.542    2.928    
 (1.045)    (0.767)    (21.722)    
Commodity  -0.238    0.298    -1.510   
  (0.295)    (0.290)    (12.558)   
British 
Heritage   0.784    0.612    31.734  
   (0.790)    (0.625)    (27.086)  
French 
Heritage   0.507    0.206    19.553  
   (0.643)    (0.522)    (23.221)  
Soc. Heritage   0.074    -0.332    18.753  
   (0.636)    (0.457)    (18.275)  
Middle 
East/Africa    9.619***    1.900**    113.956*** 
    (1.025)    (0.796)    (20.577) 
South & 
East Asia    9.388***    1.426**    115.630*** 
    (0.742)    (0.558)    (15.699) 
Europe/ 
Central Asia    9.967***    1.725***    141.737*** 
    (0.533)    (0.458)    (12.050) 
Western 
Hemisphere    10.084***    1.919***    137.660*** 
    (0.894)    (0.693)    (17.919) 
Constant 10.434*** 9.859*** 9.894***  2.163** 1.792*** 1.935***  150.029*** 149.101*** 139.689***  
 (1.191) (0.502) (0.556)  (0.949) (0.439) (0.397)  (24.694) (16.794) (14.527)  
Obs 95 97 96 97 116 118 114 118 111 113 110 113 
FS F-Stat 3.40 14.95 9.41 6.64 3.93 13.74 9.76 8.51 6.62 16.06 9.97 9.92 
FS P-Value 0.068* 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.012** 0.050** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.011** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FS F-Stat and FS P-Value are the F-Statistic and P-value from the first stage regression. 
FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. LGDPPC is the log of real GDP per capita in 2002.  KKZ2002 is a composite measure of institutional quality.  SEC9802 
is the average secondary school enrollment rate over the period 1998-2002.  LWHEATSUGAR is the only instrument.
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Table 5: The “Horserace” 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 lgdppc lgdppc lgdppc kkz2002 kkz2002 kkz2002 sec9802 sec9802 sec9802 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
 
Panel A: Gini Coefficient as Measure of Inequality 
FRAC -5.727*** -4.832** -6.261*** -2.236* -2.957** -3.265*** -207.637*** -149.189*** -221.068*** 
 (2.190) (2.090) (2.401) (1.176) (1.192) (1.173) (60.639) (43.366) (58.872) 
GINI 0.035 0.042 0.042 -0.034 -0.026 -0.052 0.534 0.320 0.378 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.089) (0.031) (0.033) (0.043) (1.668) (1.226) (2.255) 
Middle East 
/Africa  -0.444   -0.077   -21.929**  
  (0.353)   (0.210)   (9.726)  
East & 
South Asia  -0.373   -0.574*   -17.622  
  (0.560)   (0.319)   (14.586)  
Europe/ 
Central Asia  0.250   -0.279   4.179  
  (0.613)   (0.320)   (13.783)  
British Heritage   0.482   0.549   31.377 
   (0.900)   (0.474)   (27.304) 
French Heritage   0.185   0.268   20.160 
   (0.786)   (0.423)   (24.480) 
Soc. Heritage   0.193   -0.561   24.582 
   (0.914)   (0.412)   (19.400) 
Obs 97 97 96 116 116 112 111 111 108 
OIR 0.526 0.460 0.553 0.836 0.726 0.979 0.703 0.778 0.703 
Endog(FRAC) 0.018** 0.003*** 0.022** 0.254 0.038** 0.045** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
Endog(GINI) 0.621 0.385 0.639 0.337 0.610 0.318 0.699 0.628 0.784 
FS P-Value 
(FRAC) 0.000*** 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
FS P-Value 
(GINI) 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.012*** 
          
Panel B: Income Share as Measure of Inequality 
FRAC -5.538** -4.712** -6.024** -2.201 -2.915** -3.110** -217.259*** -149.476*** -233.041*** 
 (2.161) (2.031) (2.470) (1.406) (1.180) (1.358) (76.206) (44.787) (76.359) 
INC 0.035 0.047 0.033 -0.040 -0.030 -0.056 0.975 0.690 1.141 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.097) (0.041) (0.044) (0.053) (2.230) (1.706) (3.149) 
Middle East 
/Africa  -0.438   -0.087   -21.953**  
  (0.345)   (0.206)   (9.940)  
East & 
South Asia  -0.385   -0.558*   -15.675  
  (0.568)   (0.323)   (15.269)  
Europe/ 
Central Asia  0.266   -0.279   8.157  
  (0.679)   (0.405)   (17.801)  
British Heritage   0.578   0.411   29.988 
   (0.837)   (0.428)   (26.581) 
French Heritage   0.268   0.191   17.468 
   (0.696)   (0.364)   (24.606) 
Soc. Heritage   -0.016   -0.674   27.753 
   (1.041)   (0.475)   (25.433) 
Obs 96 96 95 112 112 110 108 108 106 
OIR 0.5082 0.4236 0.5289 0.9590 0.9433 0.5830 0.6496 0.7083 0.6603 
Endog(FRAC) 0.029** 0.005*** 0.056* 0.381 0.060* 0.082* 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
Endog(GINI) 0.576 0.412 0.669 0.478 0.756 0.505 0.397 0.411 0.467 
FS P-Value 
(FRAC) 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
FS P-Value 
(INC) 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Endog is the p-value of the test for the endogeneity of the instruments. 
Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can actually be treated as exogenous. OIR is the Hansen’s J test of the exclusion restriction. FS P-
Value is the  P-value from the first stage regressions. GINI is the gini coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC 
is ethno-lingual fractionalization. LGDPPC is the log of real GDP per capita in 2002.  KKZ2002 is a composite measure of institutional 
quality. SEC9802 is the average secondary school enrollment rate over the period 1998-2002.  The instruments are LWHEATSGUAR, the 
commodity exporting dummy and Latitude. 
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Table 6: Breaking Down Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 voice2002 voice2002 voice2002 polstab2002 polstab2002 polstab2002 rulelaw2002 rulelaw2002 rulelaw2002 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
FRAC -1.964 -2.506* -3.329** -2.192 -2.269* -2.533* -3.003** -3.854*** -4.317*** 
 (1.519) (1.304) (1.507) (1.423) (1.321) (1.356) (1.358) (1.439) (1.401) 
GINI -0.056 -0.046 -0.071 -0.050 -0.050 -0.052 -0.053 -0.039 -0.071 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.046) (0.038) (0.040) (0.052) 
Middle East/ Africa  -0.548**   -0.298   0.136  
  (0.241)   (0.237)   (0.252)  
East Asia  -1.188***   -0.744**   -0.595  
  (0.361)   (0.354)   (0.451)  
Europe/ Central Asia  -0.590*   -0.274   -0.258  
  (0.357)   (0.345)   (0.432)  
British Heritage   0.685   0.007   0.726 
   (0.554)   (0.501)   (0.593) 
French Heritage   0.403   -0.141   0.245 
   (0.471)   (0.415)   (0.520) 
Soc. Heritage   -0.800*   -0.472   -0.900* 
   (0.463)   (0.367)   (0.465) 
Constant 3.269*** 3.607** 4.294*** 3.000*** 3.317** 3.399** 3.515*** 3.427** 4.759*** 
 (1.177) (1.550) (1.653) (1.093) (1.511) (1.513) (1.196) (1.695) (1.791) 
Observations 116 116 112 116 116 112 116 116 112 
OIR 0.211 0.102 0.302 0.865 0.962 0.809 0.877 0.443 0.912 
Endog(FRAC) 0.335 0.109 0.038** 0.453 0.398 0.247 0.144 0.024** 0.007*** 
Endog(GINI) 0.166 0.344 0.167 0.453 0.276 0.303 0.252 0.616 0.271 
FS P-Value (FRAC) 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
FS P-Value 
(GINI) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Endog  is the p-value of the test for the endogeneity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can actually be 
treated as exogenous.  OIR is the Hansen’s J test of the exclusion restriction. FS P-Value is the  P-value from the first stage regressions. GINI is the gini coefficient. GINI is the Gini coefficient. 
INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. The Instruments are LWHEATSGUAR, the commodity exporting dummy and Latitude.   
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Table 6 Continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 govteff2002 govteff2002 govteff2002 regqual2002 regqual2002 regqual2002 corrupt2002 corrupt2002 corrupt2002 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
FRAC -2.846** -4.046** -4.274*** -3.226** -3.590** -4.370*** -2.211 -4.081** -3.934*** 
 (1.420) (1.621) (1.443) (1.498) (1.523) (1.503) (1.480) (1.624) (1.462) 
GINI -0.047 -0.032 -0.074 -0.019 -0.009 -0.039 -0.063 -0.042 -0.096 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.055) (0.039) (0.040) (0.053) (0.041) (0.045) (0.059) 
Middle East/ Africa  0.163   -0.138   0.165  
  (0.272)   (0.270)   (0.284)  
East & South Asia  -0.394   -0.616   -0.753*  
  (0.436)   (0.408)   (0.455)  
Europe/ Central Asia  -0.215   -0.175   -0.439  
  (0.438)   (0.423)   (0.459)  
British Heritage   0.863   0.673   0.770 
   (0.617)   (0.596)   (0.656) 
French Heritage   0.336   0.341   0.418 
   (0.556)   (0.533)   (0.596) 
Soc. Heritage   -0.759   -0.571   -1.080* 
   (0.544)   (0.515)   (0.559) 
Constant 3.257*** 3.226* 4.794*** 2.285** 2.225 3.416* 3.607*** 3.759** 5.628*** 
 (1.156) (1.649) (1.834) (1.140) (1.579) (1.750) (1.245) (1.785) (1.948) 
Observations 116 116 112 116 116 112 116 116 112 
OIR 0.714 0.688 0.836 0.727 0.666 0.890 0.848 0.762 0.989 
Endog(FRAC) 0.233 0.024** 0.038** 0.147 0.031** 0.022** 0.417 0.028** 0.060* 
Endog(GINI) 0.375 0.721 0.324 0.625 0.970 0.526 0.175 0.555 0.165 
FS P-Value (FRAC) 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
FS P-Value 
(GINI) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Endog  is the p-value of the test for the endogeneity of the instruments. Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can 
actually be treated as exogenous.  OIR is the Hansen’s J test of the exclusion restriction. FS P-Value is the  P-value from the first stage regressions. GINI is the gini coefficient. GINI is the Gini 
coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. The Instruments are LWHEATSGUAR, the commodity exporting dummy and Latitude.   
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Table 7: Development in Former Colonies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 lgdppc lgdppc lgdppc kkz2002 kkz2002 kkz2002 sec9802 sec9802 sec9802 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
          
Panel A: Gini Coefficient as Measure of Inequality 
FRAC -6.296* -5.422 -6.164* -3.013* -3.656 -2.755* -182.915** -153.150** -175.638** 
 (3.745) (3.869) (3.587) (1.802) (2.585) (1.491) (79.528) (75.553) (71.797) 
GINI 0.076 0.046 0.088 -0.025 -0.006 -0.021 0.959 0.044 1.170 
 (0.117) (0.076) (0.120) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (2.509) (1.584) (2.372) 
Middle East/ 
Africa  -0.425   0.069   -22.325*  
  (0.557)   (0.400)   (13.231)  
East & 
South Asia  -0.231   -0.400   -17.608  
  (0.638)   (0.380)   (16.140)  
British Heritage   0.349   0.335   9.308 
   (0.464)   (0.219)   (12.282) 
Obs 66 66 66 69 69 69 66 66 66 
OIR 0.991 0.867 0.938 0.985 0.980 0.800 0.548 0.805 0.480 
Endog(FRAC) 0.018** 0.006*** 0.015** 0.087* 0.027** 0.085* 0.033** 0.019** 0.027** 
Endog(GINI) 0.417 0.481 0.313 0.537 0.922 0.637 0.549 0.973 0.360 
FS P-Value (FRAC) 0.135 0.115 0.044** 0.150 0.128 0.051* 0.090* 0.124 0.031** 
FS P-Value 
(GINI) 0.249 0.062* 0.193 0.161 0.039** 0.122 0.232 0.047** 0.175 
          
Panel B: Income Share as Measure of Inequality 
FRAC -6.025* -5.344 -5.859* -3.058* -3.657 -2.822* -184.481** -153.838** -176.523** 
 (3.459) (3.803) (3.224) (1.790) (2.649) (1.484) (82.639) (77.875) (74.210) 
INCSHARE 0.074 0.048 0.088 -0.028 -0.006 -0.022 1.396 0.114 1.675 
 (0.106) (0.081) (0.108) (0.054) (0.058) (0.052) (2.872) (1.920) (2.749) 
Middle East/ 
Africa  -0.410   0.067   -22.264*  
  (0.559)   (0.413)   (13.417)  
East & 
South Asia  -0.271   -0.396   -17.346  
  (0.587)   (0.356)   (15.229)  
British Heritage   0.384   0.319   10.487 
   (0.445)   (0.223)   (11.914) 
Obs 66 66 66 69 69 69 66 66 66 
OIR 0.936 0.809 0.981 0.905 0.964 0.748 0.648 0.814 0.592 
Endog(FRAC) 0.013** 0.006*** 0.010** 0.075* 0.032** 0.069* 0.028** 0.022** 0.024** 
Endog(GINI) 0.395 0.466 0.298 0.602 0.998 0.717 0.428 0.862 0.272 
FS P-Value (FRAC) 0.135 0.115 0.044** 0.150 0.128 0.051** 0.090* 0.124 0.031** 
FS P-Value 
(INC) 0.221 0.079* 0.189 0.190 0.078* 0.157 0.271 0.102 0.228 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Endog is the p-value of the test for the endogeneity of the instruments. 
Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can actually be treated as exogenous. All regressions include a constant (not shown). OIR is the 
Hansen’s J test of the exclusion restriction. FS P-Value is the  P-value from the first stage regressions. GINI is the gini coefficient. GINI is the 
gini coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. The instruments are 
LWHEATSGUAR, the commodity exporting dummy and Latitude. The sample is restricted to former colonies.  
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Table 8: Results with Exogenous Inequality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lgdppc kkz2002 sec9802 lgdppc kkz2002 sec9802 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Panel A: LWHEATSUGAR as Only Instrument 
FRAC -5.211*** -3.738*** -178.452*** -4.741*** -3.373*** -153.076*** 
 (1.612) (1.138) (43.823) (1.380) (0.960) (36.613) 
GINI 0.011 -0.001 -0.161    
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.621)    
INCSHARE    0.004 -0.010 -0.656 
    (0.021) (0.014) (0.567) 
Constant 9.664*** 1.692*** 153.920*** 9.705*** 1.965*** 166.879*** 
 (0.629) (0.433) (19.554) (0.747) (0.500) (20.832) 
Observations 97 118 113 96 114 110 
FS P-Value 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
       
Panel B: LWHEATSUGAR and Tropical as Instruments 
FRAC -4.104*** -3.202*** -172.778*** -3.983*** -3.113*** -158.354*** 
 (1.174) (0.953) (44.015) (1.085) (0.860) (39.497) 
GINI 0.001 -0.006 -0.199    
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.629)    
INCSHARE    -0.004 -0.012 -0.641 
    (0.018) (0.014) (0.592) 
Constant 9.590*** 1.642*** 152.464*** 9.732*** 1.955*** 168.095*** 
 (0.542) (0.385) (18.779) (0.683) (0.476) (21.215) 
Observations 95 116 111 95 113 109 
OIR 0.283 0.323 0.928 0.303 0.513 0.877 
FS P-Value 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Endog is the p-value of the test for the endogeneity of the instruments. 
Under the null hypothesis, the instruments can actually be treated as exogenous. All regressions include a constant (not shown). OIR is the 
Hansen’s J test of the exclusion restriction. FS P-Value is the  P-value from the first stage regressions. GINI is the gini coefficient. GINI is the 
gini coefficient. INCSHARE is the income share of the richest quintile. FRAC is ethno-lingual fractionalization. FRAC is the only endogenous 
variable. 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Original Source 
FRAC Probability that two randomly selected individuals will be from different entho-linguistic groups Alesina et al (2003) 
INCSHARE Income Share of the Richest Quintile. Averaged 1960-1998 WIDER (2000) 
GINI Gini Coefficient. Averaged 1960-1998. WIDER (2000) 
lgdppc Real GDP per capita in 2002 WDI and PWT 
kkz2002 Institutional Quality Index Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
sec9802 Secondary School Enrollment Rate WDI 
voice2002 "Voice and Accountability" score. Standard normal distribution Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
polstab2002 "Political Stability" score. Standard normal distribution Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
govteff2002 "Government Efficiency" score. Standard normal distribution Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
regqual2002 "Regulation Quality" score. Standard normal distribution Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
rulelaw2002 "Rule of Law" score. Standard normal distribution Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
corrupt2002 "Corruption" score. Standard normal distribution. Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
LWHEATSUGAR log (1+area of land suitable for growing wheat/ 1+area of land suitable for growing sugar) FAO (2005) 
tropical Share of Arable Land in the Tropics Sachs and Warner (1997) 
commod Commodity exporting Dummy Easterly (2001) 
British Heritage Legal Heritage Dummy La Porta et al (1998) 
French Heritage Legal Heritage Dummy La Porta et al (1998) 
Soc. Heritage Legal Heritage Dummy La Porta et al (1998) 
Middle East/ Africa Continent Dummy  
East & South Asia Continent Dummy  
Europe/ Central Asia Continent Dummy  
Western Hem. Continent Dummy  
All variables are taken from Easterly (2007). 
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Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max. FRAC 127 0.427 0.246 0.002 0.930 
INCSHARE 129 46.640 8.687 17.573 71.211 
GINI 135 42.046 9.003 23.970 67.458 
lgdppc 107 7.924 1.004 5.802 9.625 
kkz2002 128 0.085 0.784 -1.515 1.632 
sec9802 120 72.073 34.763 5.672 162.579 
voice2002 128 0.085 0.962 -2.118 1.719 
polstab2002 128 -0.014 0.994 -2.036 1.627 
govteff2002 128 0.096 1.021 -1.638 2.262 
regqual2002 128 0.140 0.982 -2.312 1.928 
rulelaw2002 128 0.058 1.013 -1.703 2.030 
corrupt2002 128 0.046 1.056 -1.427 2.393 
LWHEATSUGAR 118 0.105 0.205 -0.393 0.578 
tropical 121 0.310 0.403 0 1 
commod 130 0.215 0.413 0 1 
British Heritage 122 0.303 0.462 0 1 
French Heritage 122 0.426 0.497 0 1 
Soc. Heritage 122 0.197 0.399 0 1 
Middle East/ Africa 128 0.297 0.459 0 1 
East & South Asia 128 0.188 0.392 0 1 
Europe/ Central Asia 128 0.305 0.462 0 1 
Western Hem. 128 0.211 0.410 0 1 
 
